


As a public service,

THE LAUCKS FOUNDATION

from time to time calls attention to published material that might contribute toward clarification or understanding of issues affecting world peace. The accompanying reprints constitute Reprint Mailing No. 112.


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April 22, 1991

The following is an excerpt from the transcript of Nobel Laureate Linus Pauling's remarks upon his receiving the first Lifetime Achievement Award from the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, April 6, 1991, at Santa Barbara, California. The full text is available from the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 1187 Coast Village Road, Suite 123, Santa Barbara, CA., 93108. (This excerpt is reprinted with permission of Dr. David Krieger, President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.)

Referring to the Persian Gulf War, Doctor Pauling said:

"I was thinking: We're going to have a ground war, and perhaps, after 50,000 Americans have died, we'll begin negotiating, talking, about the problems. Well, that didn't happen, and the reason it didn't happen was something that I should have been able to foresee but didn't foresee.

"There were 150,000 sorties against Iraq, so great damage was done by our air force and some by shells shot over from the battleships...There wasn't much response. Why wasn't there much response? Well, we had sold machines of war—planes and tanks and missiles of various sorts—to the Iraqis during the Iraq-Iran conflict when we were supporting Iraq opposing Iran. In the meantime, another trillion dollars were spent by Reagan on changing our military machine—great effort, great amounts of money expended—so that they had in Iraq, and we knew that they had, the old military machines, planes, tanks, and so on. And we had new ones, against which the old ones wouldn't be very effective. And that's what happened...I'm sure that President Bush and the people in the Pentagon and the top consultants and advisors in Washington knew that this was the situation. They knew about how superior our weapons of warfare—especially aerial warfare—were, and that this was going to be the outcome.

"What did it result in? A hundred fifty Americans killed. How many Iraq people—soldiers and civilians, old people, young people, children, babies—died? The one piece of evidence that I have: that there were 150,000 sorties. During the Second World War, in these aerial sorties, the average weight of bombs carried and dropped was 2.3 tons per sortie, and three million tons of high explosive were dropped, and there were three million people killed—one person killed per ton of high explosive bomb dropped. And that probably is right for the attack against Iraq...That means 300,000 Iraqis were killed. Iraq hasn't been willing to state what the number of their deaths was (with probably a million or more injuries), and the United States hasn't released any of our estimates of the number killed...What does that mean? Three hundred thousand Iraqis killed, 150 Americans killed: 2,000 Iraqis killed per American killed. That means that this wasn't a war...This, you could call a massacre, or a slaughter—perhaps even murder. So I'm depressed about this fact, that the United States carried out this action.

"Well, now it's been done, and perhaps it will be done again. What is the future going to hold? There are two things that might happen. One, it may be that the situation with respect to weapons will be sort of frozen. The second possibility is (there's already been discussion of this) that the weapons that we brought over there will not be brought back to the United States but will be sold to the highest bidders and as a source of income, and we'll perhaps spend another trillion dollars to develop the next generation of smart weapons so that we would still be ahead in the way that we were ahead in the fight with Iraq.

"Whichever way it happens, we have to recognize that now the United States is the one strong power on earth. And President Bush has talked about The New Order that we are going to have...There are two possibilities about The New Order: one is that we'll have a continuation of the policy that if there is some country that behaves in a way that we don't like, we'll go in and kill a good number of the people there—perhaps 300,000, if it's a good-sized country with 20 or 30 million inhabitants like Iraq—and do it in such a way that we have practically no losses, and we'll get the sort of government for them that we like...That's one possibility—a sort of rule by terrorism in the world...

"Terrorists are people who make an ultimatum—a demand of some sort in the form of an ultimatum—threatening to kill hostages or people if the demand is not met. What did President Bush do? He issued some ultimatums that were absolute, that by a certain time the Iraqis would have to withdraw from Kuwait—or else. And 'for else' consisted in our killing 300,000 Iraqis, 2,000 to 1. So it seems to me that our country has become a terrorist country on a very large scale.

"What is the alternative? The alternative, I think, has been expressed in my statement that war is immoral. To kill and maim people is immoral. The alternative would be for the United States to say:

"We are a moral country. We dominate the earth all right, now the greatest country on earth. Not the one in which the health of the people is the greatest, or the infant mortality rate is the best, or the distribution of wealth is the best, but at any rate, we can contend we are the greatest power on earth now. We are a moral country, so we are going to apply pressures to the extent that we can on any other country in the world that behaves in an immoral way. And these pressures would not be a terrorist threat to attack and kill a certain fraction of the population but would be pressures of a different sort (some of which, of course, tend to border on the immoral—such as interfering with food coming into countries so that people begin to starve in the country against which there is an embargo—but not nearly so immoral as killing large numbers of people.)

"So I hope that the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation will work in the effort to make the United States into a moral country that could lead the world into a future of morality, a future worthy of man's intelligence."

The following is quoted from "Most Powerful Nation at Odds with Kinder, Gentler Nation" by Raymond A. Schroth, S.J. (National Catholic Reporter, April 12, 1991, p. 11):

"Today, as we watch TV, and read the papers and our mail, and listen to people on the street, we are conscious of two Americas.

"The first, if a recent CNN feature report is to be believed, is the America. Its spokesman is William J. Bennett, who crows in the National Review (March 18) that the Gulf war is a 'defining event in the American psyche', that the performance of our war technology might lure more students into math and science and that those congresspeople who voted 'to the left of the United Nations' should suffer for it...

"The second America, we are told, is very small; yet it includes most of the people I know.

"Its spokesman is the former Long Island congressman, Otis Pike, who concluded: 'I didn't like it...I'm sorry, but I can't feel gloriously brave or heroic. We said repeatedly that we weren't angry at the Iraqi people, it was only Saddam Hussein. We didn't kill Saddam Hussein; we killed the Iraqi people and destroyed their nation...This was a war that glorified war.'"

The following are transcripts of two MacNEIL/LEHRER NEWSHOUR "conversations" on the lessons of the Persian Gulf War—the first by Robert MacNeil with Prof. Walt Rostow, a historian at the University of Texas at Austin (March 18, 1991); the second by Judy Woodruff with Dr. Willard Gaylin, clinical professor of psychiatry at Columbia College of Physicians and Surgeons in New York (March 19, 1991.)
(Permission to reprint granted by MacNEIL/LEHRER PRODUCTIONS)

CONVERSATION - LESSONS OF THE WAR

MR. MAC NEIL: Now we have another in our series of special conversations about the lessons to be learned from the Persian Gulf war. With us tonight is Walt Rostow, a historian at the University of Texas at Austin. Professor Rostow served in the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. He has written many books, including one which the Association of American Publishers recently named the best book in social sciences in 1990. It is called "Theorists of Economic Growth From David Hume to the Present". Professor Rostow, welcome. Thank you for joining us.

PROF. ROSTOW: Delighted.

MR. MAC NEIL: Just before I ask you the lessons from the war, you have been listening to the education discussion. Do you have a feeling, as many people would like to think, that this country can translate the will to act so decisively internationally into a will to act decisively domestically?

PROF. ROSTOW: Yes I do think that is possible. Not merely because of the yellow ribbons and the feelings generated in the war but because as I look at the country as a whole and move about it, I have a feeling that the sense of community is really much stronger than most people would allow. And I see it every day in the volunteer work of students and older people and the cooperation between business and labor that is extending and the cooperation between Universities and the private sector. What has not happened is that that potential communal feeling which I insist is really quite strong and alive in our country has not been translated in to national policy. And when it is I think politicians who really mean it will find a strong answering voice.

MR. MAC NEIL: And it was in the war. It was translated into policy in the war.

PROF. ROSTOW: It was no doubt. But this is a long pull. I have been a teacher since 1940, which is a reasonable time span, and I know that what was talked about with such intelligence and commitment tonight is possible but only if we make it a long pull effort and that I think has got to be emphasized because the war was a quick fix at least in the military end of it and that was good and many lives were saved because it was well done and short. But a good education policy is going to be like fixing the Middle East. It is not going to be a job of six or eight months.

MR. MAC NEIL: Do you agree with the new Secretary of Education that Americans don't know the league they are playing in when it comes to education?

PROF. ROSTOW: I am sure of that. The competition we face now with Japan and Korea and the other young tigers in East Asia is just the beginning. The central fact about the next couple of generations is that we are in for a sustained gut wrenching competition, economical, intellectual, creative and it will take the very best that this continent, this continental society is capable of to hold our own and if we do not hold our own, if we don't remain a vital society and a creative society, making the most of the human beings in it, we are going not be able to fill the critical role as not dominating power, not the single super power but what we really are is the critical margin and to fulfill that role in critical margin as we did in organizing the coalition, listening to others and finding ways of moving together in a very complex and difficult situation. Unless we fulfill that role at the moment there is not actor in the world scene that can do it. Europe is not yet sufficiently unified. The Soviet Union has its troubles, although I think in a generation it may emerge as a major and creative actor. China has obviously enormous problems still to solve, so does Japan and to hold our own economically and to fulfill our role in the World is going to take a sustained

creative effort. But my own feeling is about my society that if you look at the grassroots and not at bullwash you'll find the foundations are there for such a sustained effort.

MR. MAC NEIL: Well come back to the war now and what this country can learn from it. What are the lessons you think that should flow from it?

PROF. ROSTOW: One is that the military nature of the war was unique and we shouldn't draw too general conclusions. It isn't often that we have an opponent with the lack of imagination to line up all his troops in a, as you know, line when there is a great wide desert out there to outflank him and six months of air supremacy to cut his military establishment to ribbons. And we are also sitting on the biggest gas station in the world in Saudi Arabia and the transport and logistics of gasoline is very important next to ammunition in a war. And there are other advantages that are unlikely to be repeated. On the other hand, there was something about this war that has an abiding lesson in it. The President picked a limited legal moral objective that everyone could understand, that rallied the country and rallied the coalition. He then threw behind this limited objective massive forces, overwhelming forces and produced a quick victory. That is the kind of formula which I think we should not forget.

MR. MAC NEIL: What about political lessons?

PROF. ROSTOW: Politically the war should never have happened. But I am simply not scoring off the diplomacy of the Administration which in a way was summed up by former President Reagan who said we all goofed in dealing with Saddam Hussein. The truth is we goofed in that sense in dealing with the Germans before we got in the first World War. We had an election in which Mr. Wilson ran on too proud to fight. He kept us out of war and he was declaring war on the Germans by April because they declared unrestricted submarine warfare. We behaved in the 30s with Congress frustrating the President in trying to prevent the war in a way that led both the Japanese and Hitler to feel that we would be no factor in the War and we double-crossed them. Before the war in Korea we behaved in such a way that meeting in Moscow, Mao and Stalin could feel that we didn't think that South Korea mattered. And then when it happened we made a federal case out of it. I think we have to try to understand ourselves better and by that I mean stop vacillating between the view that we are a peace loving nation and will never fight and the fact that when instinctively we feel a vital interests in danger we do indeed fight. We in a way have been the inscrutable West, much more difficult I think to understand than the so called inscrutable East.

MR. MAC NEIL: Because you are saying Washington gave Saddam Hussein the impression that it wouldn't fight in this one?

PROF. ROSTOW: That is correct and I think that our performance surprised him no end and there were other things that led him to conclude that we couldn't mount the kind of war that we did. But in part we suckered him into it.

MR. MAC NEIL: Apart from being willing to fight, what lessons should the U.S. learn from this situation?

PROF. ROSTOW: Well I think the biggest lesson now we face on the stage in the Middle East a version of what we are going to have to do working with others in other regions of the world. We have to try to bring political settlements there of aching issues backed by ardent feelings and it is not going to be easy but Secretary Baker has at least begun the task. On that basis we have to get arms control agreements in the Middle East of the kind that we are almost completing in Europe which would make it most unlikely and uninteresting for any single power to think that it could gain total control of the Middle East as various leaders have felt they might pull it off in the last 40 years. We then have to do something about making the resources, the excess revenues from oil available to the whole region, not to buy off blackmailers or to support violence but to provide help to the less advantaged.

MR. MAC NEIL: Excuse me for interrupting. How do you do that?

PROF. ROSTOW: Once you get a willingness to do it, it is easy. You set up a Middle East development bank with oil revenues from the Gulf States that have surpluses and hook that regional bank with criteria of the World Bank and other regional banks and help the states that need help in the region. We've done that in Latin America. We have a regional development bank in the Far East. We have one in Africa which is less influential but I think what is necessary is a conclusion among the people in the Middle East that enough is enough. In history there is the famous case of the Treaty of Westfalia in 1648 that ended the 30 years war. We've had in the Middle East a war of more than 30 years. And there does come a time when people do say and should say enough is enough, how do we organize this place in peace.

MR. MAC NEIL: What about outside the Middle East in the larger world outside?

PROF. ROSTOW: Well the people in the Middle East would have to insist and the major powers would have to agree that the Middle East is no longer a play thing for minor advantage by shipping arms. I don't think anyone, any power whether it is the United States or the Soviet Union, or France or whomever has really gained any significant advantage from competitive selling of arms in the Middle East, on the contrary, and I think that if the people of the Middle East decide they want peace and set the arms limits, inspected arms limits that would not threaten each other the international community of arms producers would fall in line.

~~MR. MAC NEIL~~
PROF. ROSTOW: What about the lessons for the wider world outside the Middle East in the future and what role the United States should play there?

PROF. ROSTOW: I think that in a curious way a higher authority sent Saddam Hussein among us perhaps to tell us in a rather painful form the kind of problem that we have to try to solve in the next 50 years. Because what is involved in the world as it is emerging is a proliferation of nations which will command the technology to produce weapons of mass destruction. He came awfully close on a rather limited industrial base with the help of what he got from abroad. But there are other countries of enormous size that are going to emerge in the next generation or two. They may not be as rich as the United States, Western Europe or Japan but they will command all the relevant technologies. I am thinking about India which is well on the way and China and Mexico potentially and Brazil and Indonesia. This has been a world in fact in which power has been moving away and defusing away from the United States and the Soviet Union for a long time. I would say since 1948. But that is going to extend and our common task which is also the task of the Middle East is to make sure that the diffusion of power does not lead to chaos but leads to a World, as the President said, of order and law. Now to do that you have to have a sustained coalition of the United States, Western Europe and Japan, perhaps joined in time by Russia that has found its way through its great transition and we have to set structures in being before we have the kind of crisis we have in the Middle East, structures which would make it unattractive for any nation to envisage regional or global hegemony.

MR. MAC NEIL: Structured like what?

PROF. ROSTOW: Well, like the Pacific Basin, which is beginning to emerge on an inter-governmental basis. Europe in a way is a model of what we'd be trying to achieve. I think that quite aside or in addition to the Canadian-U.S.-Mexican free trade area, we ought to begin to think of a hemispheric organization which would have economic functions. It would be quite a different one. It's not a return in nostalgia to the alliance for progress. But it would be a structure in which we could help the countries which, for example, have less capacity than Brazil, Mexico.

MR. MAC NEIL: Sorry to interrupt you, Prof. Rostow, but we have to leave it there and thank you very much for joining us. Thank you.

CONVERSATION - LESSONS OF THE WAR

MS. WOODRUFF: Now another in our series of special conversations about the lessons to be learned from the Persian Gulf War. Up until now we have heard from a group of distinguished historians. Tonight we turn to a psychiatrist who specializes in ethical issues. He is Willard Gaylin, clinical professor of psychiatry at Columbia College of Physicians & Surgeons in New York. Dr. Gaylin is also president and co-founder of the Hastings Center which researches ethical issues in the life sciences.

Dr. Gaylin, thank you for being with us.

DR. GAYLIN: Thank you for having me.

MS. WOODRUFF: What did you observe, first of all, about the way Americans reacted to this war, about their feeling about it? What struck you about that?

DR. GAYLIN: Well, I think it was clear to all of us that as horrible it is to say, that war is a kind of tonic. The people were mobilized by it. There is a kind of thrilling thing in a war, at all wars, I might say, in the beginning. This was a peculiar war. It only had a beginning. There was no middle, a beginning and an end. Wars become disgusting and terrifying in the middle when people we know are touched by them, or somehow or another when our whole lives are changed by them, but this was a war which played into the need for community and also was a kind of war which was a corrective too. It wasn't just a war. It was when it happened.

MS. WOODRUFF: What did you mean when you said it was a tonic? What are you saying?

DR. GAYLIN: Well, we live kind of hum drum lives and there is a sense of ennui, boredom, frustration, et cetera. I think almost any mobilizing force is a tonic. People get excited about a snowstorm. People get excited even when there's a disaster like in New York when there's a transit breakdown of one sort or another. What it is is that it puts us in touch with other people. It forms a community. We live in a kind of isolation and anonymity that is very, very frightening I think, and so even a war, what it did was make a collective community of 200 million people, that's not easy to do. Most of us don't even have a community of five in a family.

MS. WOODRUFF: When you say it made a collective community, what do you really mean, because for many people, the war was watching television and watching television news, reading about it in the newspaper, what do you mean?

DR. GAYLIN: We were all watching the same thing. We were all reading the same articles. We couldn't wait for it, particularly this war, which turned out to have a good guy, a bad guy, heroes, none of the mess of Vietnam, none of the agonies or frustration and impotence, and it led to an ending which had a kind of almost theatrical quality to it; so that it did have a stimulating effect on people who do lead fairly dull lives.

MS. WOODRUFF: But is there something -- is there something wrong with taking pleasure or pride or whatever in what I think some --

DR. GAYLIN: Of course there is. Maybe not here. I mean, I happen to think this was a just war, a good war. Whether we should have gone actually the way we did is beside the point. I don't want to get into politics. Much brighter people discuss the political aspects of it. But in a sense, there is pride, particularly after the sense of frustration after Vietnam. There was such a sense of impotence, such a sense of betrayal. I just recently saw Gen. Schwarzkopf in a remarkable interview with Barbara Walters in which he talked about his own humiliation as a senior officer at the lack of leadership, his contempt for the leadership during that war. If he as a professional soldier felt it, all of us were in agonies about that war. This then came as a corrective. Now I don't think that's going to last forever. But it also pointed out a hunger that is here for some integrating force for our lives.

MS. WOODRUFF: But on the other hand, on your point about it being a tonic and making us feel good, as you know, some commentators have pointed out that there's something almost inappropriate about that when after all, tens of thousands of Iraqis were killed, we flattened the infrastructure of the country. How do you strike a balance there, or should Americans even worry about that?

DR. GAYLIN: Well, I think of course, that was the starting point I think that both of us comment on, but it is a shame that this is where we have to find a sense of community, but this is something we've done to ourselves. It wasn't just the Vietnam War. We have seen a progressive movement away from the sense of community. We kind of had a glorification of the isolated self, so that everything in our country has been individual-oriented, to hell with the community. We talked about rights, rights, rights, rarely about duties or obligations and responsibilities. Now I understand that for the helpless rights are everything, so rights defend the helpless, but it's duties, obligations, and responsibilities that expand us, that make us feel more than just survivors.

MS. WOODRUFF: All right. Sense of community, what do we do with it if it's there, as you say?

DR. GAYLIN: Well, it isn't there. Last night on your program the speaker said that he had a sense of community. I don't see it anywhere. I think what he would see --

MS. WOODRUFF: This was Walt Rostow, the historian.

DR. GAYLIN: Yes. What Mr. Rostow was seeing was a hunger for community. Now that's worrisome because it leads to a couple of things. One, it leads to the glorification of war, and no war in a sense should be glorified. It's a necessity at times, and it's just at some times, but it's dreadful for the very reasons you gave to ennoble it as such. It may be a necessity. But what there is out there is a hunger for some sense of community. We've done this to ourselves. We've acted as though individuals' existed in splendid isolation.

MS. WOODRUFF: But what do we do with that now, with this hunger, what do we do with it?

DR. GAYLIN: What are the solutions you want?

MS. WOODRUFF: That's right.

DR. GAYLIN: Well, don't forget, you're not talking to a surgeon. See, surgeons are wonderful; they have simple solutions. You take a knife and you cut. You're talking to a psychiatrist so my solutions are slow, tangential, elliptical, difficult, and they cost a lot. I will say that I think they work. I think that people are desperate for service, are desperate to belong, are desperate for community. People want to help. We've had a rotten leadership. We've had rotten models. We've had the assumption on the part of our leaders that we were all selfish, that we were all autonomous. It's very dangerous because we are not. You take an individual away from other individuals and he ceases to be human in the best senses of those words.

MS. WOODRUFF: But how can you be so sure that people are ready to serve or to make sacrifice, or whatever you're suggesting about other problems, when we didn't -- when for most Americans -- obviously not for the ones that have loved ones over there, that was a great suffering for them, but for most Americans it was sitting back and watching it on television. I mean, what was the sacrifice that you saw that leads you to think that people are ready to serve?

DR. GAYLIN: None. That's why I think this is a short lived thing. That's why I said it was a tonic. I didn't see it as a cure, but what we should learn from it is that there is a readiness for belonging. There was a sense of enhanced pride which we needed. I don't know how long it's going to last. It was, as you say, partly a passive thing. We weren't there. We weren't involved, but what I think it illuminates is the desperate need for us to be involved somehow with community. You know, the whole history of the '60s was a kind of a contempt for authority and an assumption that the individual alone could find his salvation. It simply isn't true. We see even disillusion is very hard to identify with anything. You see it in sports I guess, another passive thing, where we're all sitting, ready to kill each other over a basketball game or something of that sort. But this country desperately needs to return to a more communitarian base.

MS. WOODRUFF: And what do you think people are ready to do? What is it, what are the problems that you think we're ready to do?

DR. GAYLIN: I think if there wasn't such an abdication of leadership, look, we've got enough problems out there. We at least used to have the community as a family. Now we euphemistically talk about the one parent family. It's a joke. What's a one parent family when the parent is a 13 year old black girl in the middle of the city? That's a no parent family. It's two children, one dependent on another, and the other dependent on the state. We have simply got to remember -- you have to go back to Aristotle, if you will -- he was not a bad biologist and he was a superb philosopher and politician -- and recognize that we have to spend more time on the collective. We haven't been doing that. We've been allowing people to lie on the streets of New York because the libertarians in our midst for the best of reasons -- they're all my friends -- are protecting their autonomous rights to freeze in the streets of the City of New York, and I as a psychiatrist can't -- can't bring them into a hospital for two or three weeks because it's benevolence, it's paternalism, and it's suspect.

MS. WOODRUFF: But you're saying that you're convinced based on the experience of this war that many Americans are willing now to make a sacrifice, to serve in a way that they haven't been asked to or willing to before?

DR. GAYLIN: Not just -- oh, I think they were always willing to -- not just on the experiences of this war, of course not. It was too short and I would be really an idiot to make inferences from that, but at any time that there has been a leader, the most quoted statement of John Kennedy, it's a cliché, it's almost embarrassing to say about "Ask not what your country can do for you", touched people. We have had just a paucity of heroes. There's a hero hunger here and I'm very, very frightened that we will take the wrong heroes as they come along. I made a joke, but I suppose Pres. Bush will be our President in perpetuity or at least until -- unless the Democrats draft Gen. Schwarzkopf, who seems to have a certain kind of charisma that Pres. Bush does not have except during the war.

MS. WOODRUFF: What do the American people do then? You're saying that our political leadership leaves something to be desired. Where do they turn? Where do they turn for leadership? Does it have to come from the President? Can it come from somewhere else?

DR. GAYLIN: I'm afraid on the actual level it does have to come from the President. You don't want for Senate, and maybe Schwarzkopf doesn't run for Senate, Mr. MacNeill doesn't run for Senate, I don't, but the kind of people that have to run for Senate are not necessarily the kind from which you'd assume you will get major leadership. If we do, we're lucky about it. I think the President does set a tone because of television, because of the fact that he has a direct approach to people. I'm not sure that the past Presidents we've had, many of them have been very, very good men, except for Reagan, who had a capacity to speak directly to people -- unfortunately he didn't seem to have much to say to them -- but he certainly had the capacity to speak to them. But I do think there's an absence of leadership and I think there's an intellectual community, the academic community is to blame too. It too has a noble individual without recognizing that there is a public space that has to be protected and a communal need.

MS. WOODRUFF: But do you come out of this feeling optimistic, hopeful, or otherwise?

DR. GAYLIN: Well, I'm an incurable optimist. I'm always hopeful, so I wouldn't bet anything on that. And I don't come out of this. I just see this as one small element that the country can be mobilized. There was a kind of sense people, they were all talking, they were all watching, they were all wishing, they were all putting out flags, and there may be a certain amount of hokum with that. But they were trying to touch other people in the community. In that way, the flag, the yellow ribbon, all that stuff was a method of abortive communication.


MS. WOODRUFF: Well, Dr. Willard Gaylin, we thank you for being with us.

DR. GAYLIN: Thank you for having me.



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